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I have a long-standing admiration for Stephen Munzer’s work, dating back to his careful and synergistic analysis in A Theory of Property. That respect has been enhanced by his continuing ability to predict and explain the ethical and legal impact of unprecedented biotechnological developments, in such major articles as ‘An uneasy case against property rights in body parts’ (Munzer, 1994), ‘The special case of property rights in umbilical cord blood for transplantation (Munzer, 1999) and, most recently, ‘Human-nonhuman chimeras in embryonic stem cell research’ (Munzer, 2007). So it is with that rarity in academia, a genuine spirit of collaboration, that I offer up this article’s criticisms. 

I make ‘an uneasy case’ against the moral particularism of Munzer’s theory of property in general, and, in the more specific context of cord blood banking, against what I regard as an unexamined and untenable assumption that umbilical cord blood belongs to the newborn rather than to the mother. These points are rooted in the feminist analysis of my books Property, Women and Politics (1997) and Property in the Body: Feminist Perspectives (2007), but they are not confined to feminists like myself. The UK Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists has received legal advice that cord blood is the mother’s property, if anyone’s. While that may seem an arcane point, it has important ramifications for informed consent, commodification and regulation of private interests’ claims in body parts, as well as for Munzer’s overall theory of property. 

What I have long esteemed in Munzer’s work is his ambition to consider all the angles of new developments that often receive only a superficial analysis. I hope this critique will be taken as ‘an uneasy case’ that in a crucial aspect of cord blood banking and other new biotechnologies, he still has important work to do.

Property in the Body: The Case of Umbilical Cord Blood

In his article ‘An Uneasy Case against Property Rights in Body Parts’ (1994), Munzer takes issue with the acceptance by some other scholars (especially Margaret Radin, e.g. 1993) of commodification of the human body. Although he denies that markets in body parts should be prohibited altogether, he does feel that there is a qualified and ‘uneasy’ case against the sale and transfer of body parts in markets. (Here I should state straightway that I am much more on Munzer’s side than Radin’s, although I would go further than he does in prohibiting markets in body parts.) While Munzer is typically pluralistic rather than a ‘straight’ adherent of any one philosophical school, central to his position on property in the body is a Kantian notion of human dignity as an unconditioned and incomparable value. Entities with dignity, such as human agents, differ from things that have only a market price. It is morally objectionable for persons to sell their body parts, in Munzer’s view, if they offend dignity by transferring them for a reason which is not proportionate to the nature of the body part sold.

Now one great difficulty in modern biotechnology is that the Kantian distinction between things and agents is under continued and concerted attack, as is the distinction between things external to ourselves and things within our bodies. External objects such as pacemakers can be incorporated into our bodies, while some body tissues and parts can be separated from our bodies and transformed into objects for our use. Following the Marxist conceptions of objectification and commodification, tissues and body parts so transformed have been objectified; where they have additionally been made subject to market transfers, including but not exclusive to sale, they have also been commodified.

Is it only the commodification of body parts and tissues which offends against human dignity, or is objectification inherently wrong? One would expect Munzer to oppose the latter position, since his ‘unease’ is primarily with the sale and transfer of body parts and tissues in markets. One form of body tissue whose objectification Munzer does seem to accept is umbilical cord blood, which is taken between the second and third stages of labour by a process involving clamping the cord and extracting the blood for storage in a ‘bank’, for the child’s future use if stem cell technologies ever advance sufficiently. Such banks may be either private or public; the two forms raise different moral and clinical issues. 

In his articles ‘The special case of property rights in umbilical cord blood for transplantation’ (1999) and ‘Limited property rights in umbilical cord blood for transplantation’ (2001), Munzer was among the first to explore the legal and ethical issues involved in this comparatively new technology. (See also Annas, 1999; Haley, Harvath and Sugarman, 1998; Kirschenbaum, 1997; Vawter 1998.) Particularly in suggesting the utility of a property model, Munzer did indeed break new ground, as was later recognised by other commentators (e.g. Dame and Sugarman, 2001). I agree entirely with Munzer that a property model is appropriate, but I feel that it is unfortunate that Munzer’s model rests crucially on a clinically and legally dubious assumption: that the property rights to the cord blood vest in the newborn, and the child or adult that newborn will become. This apparently untested presupposition has serious ramifications for his work, as well as for public policy—and I sense that Munzer does want his work to matter for public policy, rightly enough.

In my view, and that of the leading professional body in the United Kingdom, cord blood is the mother’s property, to the extent that, following Moore, Greenberg and Kelly, there can be any such thing as ownership of tissue once it has left the body. (The same reservations would also apply if the cord blood were regarded as the property of the newborn, because of the traditional common law view that tissue outside the body is res nullius, no one’s thing. In the Kelly case, however, the application of labour and skill was held to create property rights in tissue products.) When we view cord blood as the mother’s property, rather than the newborn’s, we come up with very different and more disturbing conclusions about consent to the procedure and transfer of property rights in the blood. (Dickenson 2007, 2008)

The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists took legal advice during the evidence-based consultations that produced its two Scientific Advisory Committee Reports on the practice of umbilical cord blood banking (RCOG, 2001, 2006). That advice decisively rejected the assumption that cord blood belongs to the baby by virtue of genetic or immunological identity. (RCOG, 2006, section 6) It seems clear that Munzer assumes the former—genetic identity as the basis for ownership rights: he claims that both parents have a genetic share in the baby’s genome and therefore should share an equal right to control the disposition and management of the newborn’s cord blood (Munzer and Smith 2001, 205). But, as the RCOG report noted,  genetic identity is rarely if ever the basis of property rights. The cord blood, the report declared, should be regarded as a gift from the mother to the child, not as the child’s property by right. In the report’s view, the UK Human Tissue Act 2004 likewise vests ownership of the placenta and cord blood in the mother. At least in the UK context, by statute, and also in other jurisdictions, by reasons of jurisprudential reasoning and physiology, Munzer’s assumption that cord blood belongs to the newborn is flawed.

Normally, in the absence of clamping and harvesting of cord blood, the infant would receive all the blood supplied through the conduit of the cord from the mother. The mother is the donor of the blood and the infant the recipient, in the usual case. Where cord blood is taken, a portion of that blood is donated by the mother to the public or private cord blood bank, rather than to the infant. It is donated for the infant’s benefit, in private directed banking, but it only ‘belongs’ to the infant because the mother has transferred her entitlements in it. For these physiological and legal reasons, it is better to view cord blood as either a conditional gift or possibly even a sort of settlement in trust from the mother. 

Thus the mother’s gift of the blood to the child is a transfer, but obviously not a transfer by sale. Presumably within Munzer’s ‘uneasy case’ framework, it would not be an objectionable transfer, because the motives for transfer are altruistic and are not incommensurate with the dignity of the tissue. But it is still a transfer from mother to child. This is important because if the cord blood were regarded as the child’s by right, it could conceivably be required of the mother that she should supply the child with it, despite the known risks involved in clamping and taking cord blood (Weeks 2007). It is also important because here, as in the production of ova for somatic cell nuclear transfer stem cell technologies, women are producing tissue of commercial value without receiving adequate recognition for it. (Dickenson, 2007, 99; Waldby and Cooper, 2008) This is a denial of women’s agency and labour, and an injustice. 

Whereas most commentators, like Munzer, simply assume that the cord blood belongs to the baby on the basis of genetic identity, I have argued that it is the mother’s on Lockean grounds (Dickenson 1997, 2007, 2008). Locke actually denies that we possess property rights in our bodies, as opposed to the work performed by our bodies, because we have not laboured to create our corporeal frame. Genetic or biological identity, or the mere fact of being ‘connected’ to one’s tissue, is insufficient to ground property rights. Munzer himself has rehearsed the merits of a labour-desert model of property, a variant of Locke’s doctrine that investing work in an object confers property rights in it (1990). Yet he seems unable to see the possibility that the mother’s labour in childbirth generally, and particularly in undergoing the additional intervention required, might ground a property right in the cord blood. Indeed, he does briefly consider whether a labour-desert model might apply to cord blood but rejects it, because the fetus in the womb does not invest labour in producing tissue. (1999, 497) 

Yet the mother does: cord blood is not merely ‘waste’ discarded with the placenta after childbirth is complete, as some private cord blood banks misleadingly imply. (Dickenson 2008, 54-57) It is taken by an additional procedure between the second and third stage of delivery, putting both mother and infant at some additional risk, particularly if the attention of delivery staff is diverted from the crucial stages of the baby’s first breaths and the delivery of the placenta, when the woman is most at risk of haemorrhage. The actual function of the ‘waste’ claim—made, to be fair, not by Munzer but by private cord blood banks—is to mask the mother’s rights in the cord blood, making it appear to be something abandoned, which is open to the private bank to process and store for a considerable fee. Here we should be reminded of the similar tactics used to claim property rights in ‘discarded’ tissue by commercial interests in the Moore care, where the claim that a $3-billion cell line was mere waste was accepted by the California Supreme Court in denying the donor (Moore) any property rights in the line developed from his tissue. Those who, like Munzer, have expressed ‘unease’ about markets in body parts should assiduously assert the mother’s rights in the cord blood as a bulwark against the operations of private commercial interests in this new sphere. 

It appears that Munzer has given little or no consideration to the possibility that the mother does invest labour not only in pregnancy and childbirth—as one childbirth manual says rightly of the second stage of labour, ‘You’ve never worked so hard in your life’ (Kitzinger, 2004)-- but in the additional procedure and possible ensuing risk necessary to extract cord blood. If, as Marx thought, productive labour is distinguished by intentionality and control, the decision to allow cord blood to be extracted requires both those qualities. Women must decide in advance that they intend this additional procedure to be performed, and that they will be undergoing it at a time when they simply want childbirth to be over as quickly as possible, because they intend to confer a benefit on their baby. (In fact, although the fact does not undermine the argument from intentionality and control, mothers are probably mistaken in thinking that benefits outweigh risks. The RCOG report makes it clear that early clamping puts the baby at extra risk of anaemia and other harmful sequelae, as does subsequent research summarised in a comprehensive evidence-based survey: Weeks 2007. The countervailing benefits are still largely speculative, although there have been advances in the past year in cord blood transplantation.)

Nor does Munzer seem fully aware of the physiological basis advanced by the RCOG reports as evidence that cord blood belongs to the mother. To begin with, cord blood is extracted from the mother’s side of the clamp, not the infant’s. At times Munzer’s reasoning seems so deductive and a priori, flying in the face of the medical facts of which he is normally such a master, as to be almost Scholastic:

	The term ‘cord blood’, used loosely, applies both to blood in the umbilical cord and to blood within the embryonic part of the placenta. This loose usage creates an ambiguity as to whether, after birth, blood is harvested from the placenta, or umbilical cord, or both. The ambiguity hinders a precise description of the harvesting procedure, but otherwise is of no consequence, for it is always the blood of the newborn that is at issue. (1999, 500)

There is actually no ambiguity or loose usage in what the term ‘cord blood’ properly denotes:  blood extracted between the second and third stage of labour from the umbilical cord. What Munzer apparently means is the distinction between the in utero method of collection, while the placenta is still attached to the uterus, and the ex utero method, when the placenta has been delivered. Public banks such as the UK national cord blood bank more often use the ex utero method (RCOG 2006) because there is less risk of maternal haemorrhage and of distraction for delivery room staff from the baby’s first breaths. In the in utero method, the blood is still pulsing from the placenta, which remains attached to the womb, highlighting the improbability of calling it anything but the mother’s blood. With the ex utero method, the placenta is delivered and taken away so that blood can be collected from the portion of the cord that remains attached to it. In both cases, however, the blood is extracted from what is or was the maternal side of the clamp, not the baby’s. 

Yet although Munzer claims there is an ambiguity where there is none—which one would think might disturb him into questioning his unexamined assumption—he simply defines it away by insisting ‘it is always the blood of the newborn’. I have been unable to find any indication that he has considered the alternative position, either here or in his later article with Smith. (2001) Unyielding commitment to the idea that the blood belongs to the baby sometimes leads Munzer into some very tortured contortions:

Perhaps the closest analogy of cord blood is blood lining the uterus, which either can serve to nourish an implanted fertilized ovum or leaves the body during menstruation. Yet the analogy is imperfect. Blood lining the uterus is the blood of a menstruating woman whose body surrounds it. Cord blood is different because, though it is fetal/neonatal rather than maternal blood, it is often circulating outside the normal contours of the body of the fetus or newborn, and further is, prior to birth, surrounded by the body of the pregnant woman. (1999, 511)

Likening the conscious and voluntary donation of cord blood to the involuntary mechanism of menstruation is a denial of a woman’s agency in deciding to undergo an additional procedure, with its possible risks, for what she believes will be a benefit to the baby. And one might well think that blood which is ‘surrounded by the body of the pregnant woman’ simply is the woman’s blood. In physiological reality, there is constant exchange of gases, glucose and antibodies between mother and fetus during fetal development. Maternal and fetal circulations are entirely intertwined, separated only by a layer of endothelium one cell thick. In genetic and immunological terms, the placenta and cord blood combine traits of both the mother and the fetus. So there is little basis in biology for assuming that cord blood belongs to the baby, and in any case genetic identity, as we have already seen, is rarely the basis of property rights. 

Against the  physiological reality, why assume that cord blood belongs to the baby? In Munzer’s case this assumption seems particularly strange, given his usual clinical accuracy and his insistence that we must use our lateral thinking caps to find a new model for property rights in umbilical cord blood, rather than relying on old analogies. (Munzer and Smith 2001) To this call for innovation and appropriateness to the specific case, I am entirely sympathetic. Munzer and Smith rightly insist that ‘all relevant factors’ should be examined in our search for new models that do justice to the new reality; yet they begin by closing off any consideration of the extremely relevant factors that make cord blood rightfully the mother’s property. More accurately, and worse still, they do not close off that avenue; they simply do not seem to see it on the map. Why has it so entirely escaped their notice?

Elsewhere in his work, from his theory of property to his most recent article on chimeras, I would argue that Munzer has also evidenced limitations in gender awareness, lessening the rigour and relevance of his important work. Rather than the universalism to which he aspires, in, for example, his attempt to create a general theory of property, he is at risk of moral particularism. His failure to consider the possibility that cord blood rightfully belongs to the mother is symptomatic of a  deeper-rooted difficulty. I will illustrate that problem in another specific case from bioethics, chimeras, before turning my attention to its manifestation in Munzer’s general theory of property.

The case of chimeras

In his recent article on chimeras in stem cell research, Munzer insists that policy decisions must ‘above all…take into account the effects on the life chances of the least well off in society and on those most burdened by chimeras’ (Munzer 2007, 136). Presumably, this calculus should also consider the effects on those most burdened by the alternatives to chimeras. 

In somatic cell nuclear transfer stem cell research, which involves inserting a body cell into an enucleated egg, the vast number of human eggs required to produce a single potential stem cell line has motivated two teams of UK researchers to request and obtain permission from the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority for the use of cow or rabbit eggs rather than human ones-- creating a variant of chimeras sometimes called animal-human admixed embryos or cytoplasmic hybrids, ‘cybrids’. (That permission has now been given statutory form in the recently revised UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, although a court challenge was issued in late November 2008, asserting that the HFEA had exceeded its statutory authority and demanding that the two teams undertaking that research cease operations under the HFEA licence, until the statute takes force in 2009.) One such researcher, Stephen Minger of Kings College London, has justified his team’s request in terms of alleviating the burden on women donors, who must undergo the risks and discomforts of egg retrieval, which is even known to have produced fatalities from ovarian hyperstimulation in some instances. (Minger 2008) 

Whether or not one approves of animal-human admixed embryos, the effect on demand for women’s eggs surely is a major factor to be considered. That is particularly true in the US system, where women providing eggs for research purposes are allowed to be paid for their ‘donation’. It seems plausible to assume that it will be less well-off women who will be tempted by the sums involved in selling eggs for research. (Vogel 2006, Sexton 2005) That may not be true for IVF, where middle-class college women are targeted more intensively than poorer women, but it is likely to be true of egg selling for research. Eggs sold for IVF can command extra premiums if they come from women with ‘desirable’ traits including hair and skin colour, which are obviously related to social status; in the case of eggs sold for research, however, the genetic content is irrelevant because the egg is enucleated. Particularly given the two-tier system legitimised by the latest International Society for Stem Cell Research guidelines (Baylis and McLeod, 2007), it can therefore be expected that women from poorer backgrounds, including African-American women and possibly even Third World Women, will be more heavily represented among those selling eggs for research. Since SCNT stem cell research requires also requires larger quantities of eggs than IVF, possibly entailing higher dosages of ovarian stimulation, the poorer women will be the ones put at greatest risk. (Dickenson, 2002, 2006, 2007, 2008; Dickenson and Alkorta, 2008; Waldby and Cooper, 2008) 

One might advocate the use of chimeras in SCNT research to prevent this stratified market in women’s eggs from developing and thus harming ‘the effects on the life chances of those least well off in society,’ as Munzer puts it. Or—as I tend to do—one might oppose chimeras on the grounds that if SCNT research can use animal eggs to improve its presently meagre success rate and shed the miasmic aura associated with it after the false claims made by Hwang Woo Suk (2004, 2005), it will become all the keener to use women’s eggs in greater numbers. Either way, one would think that the question of cybrids for SCNT stem cell research, or animal-human embryos, would be prominent in Munzer’s consideration. 

Yet none of Munzer’s scenarios replicates the SCNT situation, even though that was the most important reason why UK researchers wanted to create animal-human admixed embryos—provoking one of the only national policy decisions so far legalising a form of chimera. Rather oddly, he appears to classify the case of an embryo produced by introducing a human nucleus into a non-human egg along with other possibilities which, he says, have little interest for researchers and little relevance to his framework. Since the introduction of a human nucleus into a non-human egg was in fact the instance that prompted most pressure for new legislation in the UK, Munzer seems to have made his framework less relevant than it could be to the UK situation, at least, and arguably elsewhere as well. As in the case of umbilical cord blood banking, he also seems to have failed to consider a factor that should have been obvious from either a scientific or a feminist point of view.

Property and Moral Particularism

These limitations should matter to Munzer, I think, because he rightly aims at relevance, as well as comprehensiveness and empirical accuracy. (As he writes, ‘…[M]aking the case for better property institutions is not an optional intellectual endeavour but a practical imperative.’ [1990, ix]) That threefold ambition is evident in his Theory of Property (1990), which relies on crucial psychological assumptions about motivation and agency in the acquisition of property. In chapter one of my Property, Women and Politics (1997), I tested the empirical basis of these presuppositions against women’s experience in other cultures and other periods in our own culture. Feminist anthropological, psychological and historical accounts, I argued, would allow us to begin piecing together a theory of property which is more genuinely general than Munzer’s, but which, like his, applies a normative reconstruction of property to real-world policies, particularly in bioethics. This is the project which I have continued to pursue in Property in the Body (2007) and elsewhere. It is one to which I would hope Munzer should be sympathetic, just as I am sympathetic to his ambitions. 

Munzer’s theory of property stands in the developmental, psychological tradition that links property to enhanced subjectivity and agency. Munzer relies very heavily, by his own admission, on what he presents as universally applicable motivational background factors, even though he intends his book not as a factual survey but as an original theory of property. He is therefore vulnerable to evidence showing that these psychological arguments are not generic, but are applicable mainly to men’s experience of property-holding.

A Theory of Property begins with a thought-experiment: we are asked to imagine a ‘no-property world.’ This is not an environment which lacks the objects of property; rather, the relations of property-holding and property transfer are absent. Artefacts exist, but there are no rights of excluding others from their use, and no means of transferring them through inheritance, gift or sale. Munzer intends this picture to startle the reader, to reveal just how central property is to human society and motivation. Without exclusive property rights in artefacts, the technological level of production would remain primitive, because ‘people would probably not make the necessary sacrifices unless they could be confident of substantial control over the use and disposition of these things.’ (1990, 15-16) Not only are ‘stable possession and use…necessary to achieve some abiding ends’(1990, 79), but property-holding is also conducive to some of the virtues. So in the no-property world we would have much to lose: our most cherished projects and a portion of our moral identity.

Yet what is really startling is not Munzer’s picture of a propertyless world but his apparent failure to realise how very ordinary this world is and has been: how many women have lived and still live in such a world. The Athenian wife of Aristotle’s time, for example, had no control over the use and disposition of any personal property, not even the clothes on her back; nor did she have custody rights over her children. Yet she was expected to manage and fructify the household’s wealth, including wealth in the labour of her children, for whom she was expected to make ‘the necessary sacrifices.’ In her propertylessness, she was in much the same position as married women under the Anglo-American law of coverture, which dominated at the time Locke was writing his theory of property and which persisted in tax regimes and divorce settlements until nearly the present day.  (Basch, 1982; Pateman, 1988; Salmon, 1986) Similarly, women in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, who produce up to eighty per cent of their societies’ food, have lived under customary property regimes in which they have no ‘substantial control’ over the disposition of the products of their labour, few or no rights in land, and often limited rights over their own persons. (Boserup, 1970, 1990; Burman, 1984)

Women in these no-property worlds still exercised moral agency and practiced moral virtues, but they did not do so in the expectation of stable control over the outputs of their labours. If not for property rights, then, what do women in patriarchal economic regimes produce and reproduce for? Given the reliance which Munzer’s supposedly general theory places on supposedly universal motives, which do not fit women’s propertyless in such diverse societies, this difficulty places his ‘general’ theory of property at risk. Property and stability of expectation cannot be a universal human need, and a naturalistic account of property as an objective need must fail. This is not to deny other, non-naturalistic accounts of why men and women ought to have property: for example, a developmental, Hegelian account of property as enhancing human agency (Dickenson, 1997, chapter four). But this is not the line Munzer has chosen to pursue. Instead, in his view, the possession of property is crucial not only to the frugal, enterprising motivation that builds a higher technological level in the economy—a utilitarian justification of property—but also to a Kantian emphasis on moral agency and personality. Is this to say that propertyless women cannot be full moral agents or virtuous persons? Women, now and in the past, have tended to hold less property than men. Does that make them less than full moral subjects? Or, as I ask in Property, Women and Politics, do they hold less property because they are not construed as full subjects? 
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